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Introduction 
The basic principle I wish to emphasise today is that, in the absence of any reasonable, 
effective alternative mechanisms capable of shifting the costs of accidents onto employers, 
or of compelling them to implement adequate safety precautions, there exists a key role 
for the Government and the law to play in preventing occupational injury and disease. 
I shall examine the basic principles underlying the approach ACOSH has taken to 
reform, and the strong case which exists for Government intervention to protect workers 
from death and injury. I shall also examine some alternative strategies for control in this 
area and finish by briefly outlining what a new Work Environment Act should contain as 
the basis for a more effective tripartite approach to the prevention of death, injury and 
disease caused by hazards in the work environment. 
The basic principles 
The June 1988 ACOSH Discussion Paper on OSH Reform began by identifying the 
basic principles underlying the preferred reform model which it proposed to Government. 
(1) The present toll of injury and disease can be reduced by appropriate 
preventative measures. These may be applied at all levels, from the 
workplace to the Government. 
A New Zealand worker dies from a work accident about once every two days. Every 
day 4 workers are permanently disabled and 120 others will be injured to the extent that 
they will be off work for more than a week. In addition there is the hidden hazard of 
occupational disease. The health problems caused by new technology and the flood of 
toxic chemicals into the workplace have yet to be accurately identified. The February 
1984 I.L.O. Information Bulletin reported that the number of chemical substances to 
which workers were exposed had increased from 212,000 to 6 million between 1965 and 
1984. 
A joint study in the USA by the National Cancer Institute, the National Institute of 
Environmental Health & Safety and the National Institute for Occupational Safety & 
Health estimated that somewhere between 23 percent - 38 percent of future cancers in the 
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United States will be attributable to current or previous workplace exposures to just 6 
known carcinogens (Wailer, 1983). Other scientists have disputed these figures but they 
are still an indication of the risk workers are exposed to. 
One thing is certain, and agreed by the employer, union and Government 
representatives at ACOSH - we can do much better. The most recent ILO Statistics 
(International Labour Office, 1988) confirm this. New Zealand's work fatility rate is 
about the same as Germany and France; three times worse than the USA; 4 to 5 times 
worse than Sweden and Japan. One would expect injury rates to reflect similar patterns. 
A comprehensive and effective accident and disease prevention policy would 
undoubtedly reduce the present level of death, injury and disease. 
(2) A preventative strategy needs to focus on underlying work systems and not 
solely on making workers and employers 'aware'. Accidents and diseases do 
not necessarily occur because of 'apathy' or carelessness but also through 
unsafe and healthy systems, processes and tools. 
The conventional wisdom that accidents are caused by apathetic or (more often) careless 
workers has long been used as a smoke-screen to draw attention away from the hazardous 
nature of the work environment. The 1972 Robens Committee support for the "apathy" 
doctrine has been subject to strong criticism (Nichols and Armstrong, 1973) and on close 
examination the alleged importance of apathy proves to be greatly over-emphasized. 
Even if it were possible to classify most accidents as being caused either by "unsafe 
acts" (worker-failure) or "unsafe conditions" (e.g. machine failure) research (Ashford, 1976, 
pp. 114-115) suggests that only one third or less are the result of worker failure (and many 
of these may be the fault of persons other than the worker). Moreover, the unsafe 
acts/unsafe conditions dichotomy is itself an over-simplification since almost all accidents 
are the result of worker-environment interactions to which one cannot attribute a single 
cause. No doubt unsafe acts by some workers do contribute to some accidents, but there 
is overwhelming evidence that inexperience, inadequate language comprehension, 
insufficient training and information, production pressures, fatigue, stress and monotony 
are among the most common explanations of worker-error, rather than apathy. 
Probably the most comprehensive study of the causes of accidents was undertaken at 
the National Institute of Psychology in the United Kingdom (Powell and Ors, 1971) and 
after an investigation of 2,000 accidents it concluded that nearly all accidents are the result 
of unsafe systems of work. The study concluded that the three factors which were of 
overriding influence on the accidents they investigated were:-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
That risks were so much an integral part of work systems as at present arranged, 
that the more work was done, the more accidents occurred; 
That the risks which accompanied each task were specific and could be changed by 
changing details of the task; and 
That people reduced their accident rate by gaining experience, i.e. they learned to 
· avoid risks. But this experience was highly specific and became blurred after time 
spent on other tasks. 
It is clear therefore that any national OSH policy must focus primarily on ensuring a 
safe work environment and a safe system of work. 
(3) For economic and social reasons, a basic level of safety needs to be 
imposed by the law on all enterprises. 
It is unfortunately a fundamental truth that unsafe systems of work are encouraged by 
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economic forces, which favour cheaper commodities over those produced at a higher cost, 
because making workplaces safer generally carries with it direct or indirect costs. It is also 
true that optimum conditions for health and safety may sometimes coincide with optimum 
conditions for profit, but in many of those situations the motivation is often ordinary 
humanity, the desire for a good public image, or a concern for increased productivity 
(indirectly related to profit) arising out of good industrial relations. In an increasingly 
competitive economy more and more employers are likely to cut expenditure on health and 
safety in order to maximise profits. 
The problem in New Zealand is compounded by the number of small firms. Of a total 
of 24,300 registered factories in the country only 490 employ 100 or more workers and 88 
percent of factories employ less than 20 workers (Department of Labour, 1987). 
Professor Bill Glass (Glass, 1987) listed the features of small workplaces which impose 
vulnerability on those employed as being:-
* Undercapitilised 
* Inferior environmental conditions 
* Greater chemical exposure 
* Unlabelled and cheaper raw materials 
* Higher injury rate 
* Higher occupational illness rate 
* Inferior inspection 
* Inferior occupational health services 
* Under-unionised/lower pay rates 
* Longer working hours 
* A ward conditions ignored. 
Society demands the achievement of goals other than profit and increasingly a 
reasonable level of protection of workers' health and safety has been recognised as a 
worthy goal. The British Common Law has not helped in this regard. The principles on 
which the Courts have decided the issues derive from the doctrine of master and servant, 
described by one 18th century jurist as one of the three great relationships of private life, 
the other two being those of husband and wife and parent and child. Recognising basic 
rights Parliament has intervened on behalf of the wife and child and there is strong 
justification for intervention on behalf of workers particularly in respect of their health and 
safety. 
Workers and unions are increasingly saying that they don't want employers and 
scientists accepting certain levels of risk on their behalf. They want a minimum level of 
risk enforced for all workplaces and to have a real input into determining those safety 
standards. 
( 4) Lax enforcement of the law undermines the position of employers who 
responsibly abide by these minimum legal standards. The law should 
therefore be adequately, uniformly and equitably enforced, through a system 
of inspection and the imposition of penalties for contraventions. 
It is one of the lesser known facts of our social history that the motivation of the more 
philanthropic millowners, such as Robert Owen & Sir Robert Peel, in promoting the 
early Factories Acts was as much self-interest as social conscience. One historian 
(Henriques, 1979) noted that they supported regulations to raise standards in factories to 
the level of their own "to prevent their rivals undercutting and underselling themselves by 
exploiting the more defenceless of their workers". 
The main problem with the system of statutory safety standards in the past has been 
that it has not been adequately enforced. The inspectorate has been understaffed and in any 
event, has shown a reluctance to prosecute. In the rare event of prosecution, courts were 
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reluctant to convict, and even where they felt compelled to do so, imposed minimal fines. 
In short, the system of enforcing legal standards has not failed (as is often alleged)- rather . 
its potential has never been fully exploited. 
(5) Because occupational health and safety is an issue affecting employers, 
workers and the Government, the establishment of a policy and the 
determination of the basic standards of safety and health secured by law 
should involve a statutory tripartite process at national level. In addition, 
it is through these tripartite structures that any conflicts which may arise 
between employers and unions over health and safety issues can be 
resolved. 
The protection of workers' health and safety is not simply a straightforward issue of 
law and industrial relations. It necessarily involves quite technical and complex issues and 
as a consequence the dogma has developed that for any particular hazard there is a correct 
standard for protection that can only be set by qualified technical experts. In my view the 
process of standard setting involves two. stages:-
1. The technical stage of establishing a link between hazard and its consequent health 
effects. This is sometimes called risk assessment and is properly the province of 
technical experts. 
2. The stage of evaluation of the social impact of those health effects. This stage is 
properly the province of laypersons, including the representatives of workers who 
are exposed to the risks. 
This distinction is a fundamental one and has to some extent been recognised in a de 
facto way in recent years. This distinction underlies the preferred model recommended by 
ACOSH which provides for decisions on standards, as a social process, to be taken by a 
Tripartite Commission, rather than a committee of experts. 
(6) Although the provision of a safe and healthy workplace is a management 
responsibility, workers need to be involved collectively in applying and 
monitoring safe and healthy conditions in the workplace. 
It is of fundamental importance to workers that they do have rights to help protect 
their own interests in health and safety matters. Neither the voluntary efforts of 
employers nor the creation or enforcement of legislation has yet succeeded in reducing 
work accidents and disease to acceptable levels. 
One criticism of the safety inspectorates, stemming mainly from the Chicago school 
of lawyer-economists, is that regulatory agencies tend to be captured or co-opted by the 
industries they are set up to regulate. While this may be a danger it is certainly not 
inevitable. It is true that, in the past, the inspectorates have been too close to 
management and have paid too little attention to the views of workers. It is therefore 
important to put in place effective structures to ensure worker involvement in health and 
safety issues in the workplace. The Code of Practice for Health and Safety 
Representatives and Committees developed by ACOSH provides such a structure which, if 
made mandatory with Representatives having legal rights, can monitor and complement 
the work of the Inspectorate. Such a system is also an important expression of the 
principle of industrial democracy. If workers have a right to have a say in anything at all 
at work it should be the right to have a say in decisions affecting their health and safety. 
But it is important that this increased worker participation should not be regarded as a 
substitute for legally prescribed standards and regulations on health and safety hazards. 
The Health & Safety Representative system should be seen as complementary to strong 
legislative regulation; as one of the means available to Representatives for exerting 
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countervailing pressure for health and safety considerations to balance the financial 
pressure which often works against improvements in health and safety. 
. That concludes my consideration of the ACOSH Basic Principles. I have spent some 
tune on them because they are the fundamental underpinning to the preferred reform option 
recommended to, and approved in principle by, the Government 
Mechanisms for hazard control 
I wish now to consider the main m~chanisms which might be available for controlling 
work hazards. I do so from the premise that employers are often not prepared to incur 
costs or reduce the productivity necessary to improve workplace safety unless they are 
subjected to some form of external pressure over and beyond normal market forces. There 
are. really 4 .such mechanisms - actions for damages at Common Law, an injury tax, 
vanable Accident Compensation levies, and regulation by statutory standards. 
!he Comm~n Law still imposes a duty on employers to provide a safe work 
environment. St~ce 1974, howev~r, there has been no sanction for breach of that duty 
because ~~ Accident. Compensation Act abolished the right to sue for damages for 
personal mJury by accident. All claims for personal injury, irrespective of fault, are of 
course made to the ACC. 
Just. how ~ffective that Common Law sanction was as an accident prevention 
mech~ms.m wt~l always .be d~bated. It is strongly argued by some that the potential 
~nancrnl mcenuve to avmd accidents was almost invariably negated by insurance and that, 
m any event, the cost of damages claims was generally small when compared with other 
employers' costs. The real problem with the tort action is that it was inefficient and 
uns~tisfac~ory in ac~ieving its primary purpose - the provision of compensation to 
accident vtc~ms - so It has been replaced in New Zealand and there is no real public wish 
to resurrect It. 
An alternative, and untried, technique for hazard control is the injury tax which has 
~n promot~d by some economists. The idea is that firms could choose to accept higher 
IDJury .and dt~ease rates ~nd pay their .associated costs, including the injury tax, or they 
~o.uld mvest m prev~ntattve measures m order to reduce their incidence. In my view the 
IDJU~ ta~ ca~ readily be rejected. It is no more acceptable than waiting for another 
thahdomtde .~•saster and .then ~ing the responsible company for every limbless child 
born. In addition, occupational dtseases may have a latency period of 20 years or more and 
a lot can happen to a company in 20 years which will enable the tax liability to be 
avoided. 
The thir~ mec~anism I w~sh to con.sider are variable Accident Compensation levies. 
The theory IS that tf ACC levtes are adJusted to reflect each employer's previous accident 
record (so that empl_?yers with. bad records have to pay high levies and those with good 
~ecor~s pay low levtes or receive rebates) then each employer will be given a financial 
mcentive 1? !ed~ce workplace hazar~s. 0~ Accident Compensation Scheme already has a 
levy cl~sstftcatton syste~ of 104 mdustnal classes and employers pay levies roughly 
proportiOnate to the costs Imposed by the levy on the fund. This has not in itself acted as 
a fi~ancial ince?tive on employ~rs to inve~t in accident prevention and thereby reduce their 
levt~s. In fac~ mste~d of cleamng up thetr own act employers invariably blame the ACC 
for ~ncreases m thetr own accident costs. The Freezing Industry employers have been 
p~cularly ~utspoken a~d have never acknowledged that they can substantially influence 
thetr own levies by ~educmg the number and severity of accidents in their industry. 
A furth~r extension of the levy classification system is what is known as experience or 
pena~ty-rating. Both relate levies to the individual employer's accident record and arguably 
p~o~tde ~e n~cessary financial incentive to improve safety performance. There are some 
difftculttes wtth such a system. Firstly, research shows that experience-rating cannot be 
even partially applied to firms with less than about 100 employees; secondly the system 
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cannot take into account occupational diseases which frequently have time-lags of 20 years 
before symptoms appear; and thirdly if expe?ence-rating i.s intended to ·:internalize" the 
full costs of accidents this would not be achieved by levymg on the basis of the cost of 
compensation paid because this does not reflect the full costs of .accid~nts. Neverth~less 
despite these difficulties it is possible to devel?P. a system which will at least achieve 
greater equity as between different employers withm the same levy class than the present 
system can do. . . . . . . 
Penalty-rating provides the best option if accident prevention IS the pnmary ~bJecuve. 
This involves the imposition of an additional penalty levy on an employer with a bad 
claims record or where observed conditions in a workplace indicate a greater than average 
risk. Penalty-rating on the basis of claims record has worked quite well in the Ontario 
Workers Compensation Scheme. The philosophy there is that employers cannot be 
induced to do much about safety under a system of rewards and punishments, unl.ess the 
punishments are sufficiently heavy to ~ake an impact. In thi.s respect, penalty-rating has 
a strong advantage over experience-ratmg, unless the latter IS so structured that the full 
costs of accidents are reflected in the penalty levy. Pe~alty-rating on the basis of observed conditions is a system whic~ has w~rked well 
in British Columbia. There the standard setting and enforcement functiOns are mtegrated 
into the Compensation Board and the inspectorate is able to use claims data as the .b.asis 
for inspections and the imposition of penalty levies where hazardous workplace conditiOns 
are observed. . 
I would suggest therefore that there is proba~ly some ~alue, in .accident preve~uon 
terms in the introduction in New Zealand of a mix of expenence-ratmg (for larger firms) 
and ~nalty-rating. It would be necessary for this to be done through the Accident 
Compensation Corporation and is a cogent argument for the proposed new OSH Agency 
to be closely linked with the ACC. . . . 
However, there are real problems in any strategy relying solely on ~onomic ~ncentives 
to encourage safety. Firstly, firms do not nece~~ily act in th~ econ~mically rational way 
assumed in economist's models. Secondly, It IS probably Impossible to apply such a 
strategy to reducing the incidence of occ~pational dise~e. ~t is too easy to disguise the 
health hazards and with long latency penods any contributiOn to the real costs of such 
diseases is likely to be very limited. 
This leaves Government intervention by means of statutory standards. I suggest that 
this is the most appropriate and potentially most effective mechanism for several reasons. 
Firstly mandatory safety standards are necessary to "internalize" the costs of work-related 
injury and disease, thereby ensuring that employers take the measures necessary to redu~e 
work hazards to a socially acceptable level. Secondly workers do not know enough or m 
many industries are not sufficiently strong collectively to .b~gain effective!~ for the 
necessary health and safety protection. In any event the provis.10.n of a work environment 
up to a socially acceptable level of safety should ~ot be a barg~I?mg ~atter. . 
Where persuasion and education fail, where frrms are unwilling to_Impro~e their ~fety 
performances voluntarily, where economic incentives prove ineffecti~e o~ mappropnate, 
the law is the only technique capable of exerting pressure and compel~ng firm~ to .obse~e 
safe working practices, and of punishing offences: Its effectiveness m. ~racuce IS easily 
demonstrated, but published studies are also available. When the Bnush Power Press 
Regulations superseded a former voluntary code of practice i~ 1965 the num~r of power 
press accidents in the U.K. dropped dramatically from 503 m 1964. to 153 m 1972 .. A 
similar study (Lewis-Beck and Alford, 1980) w~s u?dertak~~ I~ the USA ~h~ch 
demonstrated that over a 30 year period the reductiOn m fatalities m ~e coal-mm~ng 
industry directly correlated with the Federal Government's budget allocation to coal-mme 
health and safety regulation. . . . 
As I mentioned earlier the system of enforcing legal standards has not fa~led m th~s 
country - rather its full potential has never ?ren realised. .The success or failure. of this 
strategy will depend crucially upon the settmg of appropnate standards, the design and 
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application of sanctions, and the enforcement and administration of the legislation. I want 
to now look at each of these briefly. 
There is a need to review on an ongoing basis the type and level of standards to ensure 
that they take account of rapid technological change and equally rapid structural changes in 
the labour force. By minimum standards I do not mean minimal. "Safe" for an 
occupational hygienist appears to mean safe in the sense of an acceptable level of risk. 
"Safe" for the worker almost universally means no risk at all. 
The reality is that the minimum regulated standards will usually be a compromise 
between the interests of capital and labour in our society. To ensure that the balance is 
fair the legislation should clearly spell out the paramountcy of worker safety and should 
provide for worker input in standard setting through the tripartite commission. 
The type of standard used is also an issue. A performance standard defines the 
employer's duty by reference to the outcome to be achieved; a specification standard defmes 
the duty in specific terms (e.g. approved safety frames on tractors). Performance standards 
are said to be more flexible and adaptable but they can also be vague and difficult to 
enforce. Specification standards provide a clearer guide and are readily enforceable and 
should be preferred where possible for this reason. Any new legislative policy should 
provide for the use of each type of standard selectively depending upon the type and 
potential severity of the hazard. 
The sanctions provided for in the legislation must be also effective. There is a need for 
a multi-faceted approach and provision should be made for: 
Fines 
They must be sufficiently high to be a deterrent; to ensure that employers have more 
to lose by infringing the regulations than complying with them. To overcome the 
apparent reluctance of courts to convict and penalize representatives of their own social 
class the present criminal penalty system could be replaced with a more flexible system of 
civil penalties, imposed by the inspectorate and recoverable in the Courts on civil 
standards of proof. Such a system operates effectively in the USA and Canada. 
Preventative orders 
These orders enable the inspectorate to compel the taking or cessation of offensive 
activity. They operate very effectively in other countries and are already provided for in 
the Factories and Commercial Premises Act. Their effectiveness is dependent upon the 
inspectorate having sufficient expertise to identify hazards and upon their willingness to 
issue notices when they do. Sanctions for non-compliance should include heavy daily 
fines. 
Licensing 
As many work hazards are created when the enterprise is set up provision should be 
made for a Safety Licence in respect of new workplaces and work processes. Similarly a 
licensing or registration system for toxic substances should be provided for. 
Written safety policies 
There should be a requirement that each firm has a written safety policy (subject to 
audit by the OSH Agency) which should set out objectives, identify the main hazards, the 
managers responsible and the safety organisation within the firm. There should be 
sufficient accountability to ensure that individual directors and/or managers can be 
penalised for failure to perform in maintaining safety standards. 
The administration and enforcement of the legislation is also crucial to the success of a 
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regulatory system. First of all there must be sufficient resources. The low priority and 
allocation of resources to the Labour Department programme has seriously hampered its 
effort An adequate inspection programme is dependent upon having an adequate number 
of inspectors. The inspectorate must also be appropriately qualified. This does not 
necessarily mean an academic qualification but the need for a technically competent and 
skilled inspectorate increases if general duties and performance standards are imposed. 
There is also a serious question in my mind about the traditional approach taken by 
inspectorates to prosecution. "Advise and persuade" has been the approach since last 
century. I shall briefly address the arguments in favour of this policy:-
1. It is argued that industrial accidents and disease are merely unfortunate by-products 
of otherwise beneficial activities. As Lang Hancock, the millionaire owner of the 
infamous Wittenoom Asbestos mine in Western Australia, said,"Some people have 
to suffer so that the majority can benefit from asbestos. "My response is that 
although the crimes of the powerless rather than the powerful are characterised as 
"the crime problem" the fact remains that crimes such as contravention of health 
and safety legislation cause enormous human suffering and economic loss. Work 
hazards should be curbed and vigorous enforcement of safety legislation is one 
means of doing this. 
2 . It is asserted that employers accept the need for regulations and are prepared to co-
operate voluntarily with inspectors without the need for prosecution. Implicit in 
this view is that there is an inevitable coincidence between safety and profit. I 
believe this argument is false. There is often a conflict between safety and profits 
and in those circumstances there is no economic incentive to voluntarily implement 
safety measures. 
3. It is also argued that criminal law has been tried and failed. In fact inspections have 
been infrequent, prosecutions rare and penalties derisory. There is good reason to 
believe that enforcement backed by severe penalties would achieve high standards of 
compliance. 
To sum up therefore, the arguments in favour of the "persuade and advise" philosophy, 
while convincing in some circumstances (e.g. where profits and safety coincide), are 
totally unconvincing in others. The fundamental misconception is that most employers 
want to comply with the law and that only ignorance, carelessness or apathy prevent them 
from doing so. For a substantial range of hazards this is simply not the case. The harsh 
reality is that most employers are unlikely to devote scarce resources to a non-productive 
item such as safety unless they feel that there is some compelling reason to do so. The 
law could, and should, furnish such "compelling reasons", by establishing minimum 
standards in such a way that it is both unattractive and unprofitable to fall below them. 
Use should be made of claims data from the ACC to focus effort on high risk firms and 
industries. This approach works very effectively in places like British Columbia where 
the inspectorate is integrated into the Compensation Board. 
I should emphasize that I consider that there is also a valuable role for consultative 
services, education and training programmes, and advice and public information initiatives. 
There should be no reason for employers to raise ignorance as a re2.son for failing to meet 
the required minimum standards. 
However, even an inspectorate with substantially increased resources cannot be 
everywhere at once and there is clearly a need to increase the inspectorate's reach though an 
effective Health & Safety Representative System. It is simple logic to enlist the support 
of those who have the greatest interest in reducing the hazards of work - the potential 
victims, the workers themselves. They can assist and monitor the performance of the 
inspectorate. 
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The ~ode of Pra~tice negotiated ~n a tripartite basis through ACOSH provides the 
opportum~ to establ~sh a compr~hensive wor~lace organisation directed exclusively at 
the prevention of accid~nts and disease. Expenence in other countries (including Sweden, 
the U.K. and Australia), has shown that workers make an effective contribution to 
wo~kplace ~atters only. w~en they are organised and express themselves collectively. 
Uruons provide an organisational structure as well as the back-up and resources that enable 
workers to reach and promote decisions that reflect their interests. It is natural therefore 
that the network of_I~ealth & Safety Representatives should mesh into this existing 
structure for the provisiOn of resources and basic training. 
. .There has been a very disappointing response to the Code. A recent survey has 
mdic~ted ~a.t only 1.5 per~e~t of employers adopted the complete Code with 10.7 percent 
adoptmg It m s?me modi~Ied. form, and there is also evidence that employers have 
attempted to avmd any Umon mvolvement. It is clearly necessary to legislate to ensure 
that the. Health & S~f~ty Representative System is fully implemented and it is 
encouragmg that_ the Mmister of Labour has confirmed publicly on various occasions that 
the Government mtends to do that. 
The legislation 
To concl~de I shall ou~ine. the principles and objectives which I think should be brought 
together m the new legislation. The New Act should: 
* Have a strong objects clause stating the ideal we should be working to achieve 
The Norwegian Act provides an example: · 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
To _ensure a. working environment that provides workers with complete safety 
agamst ~hysical an? mental hazards and with a standard of technical protection, 
occupatl~nal hygien_e and welfare corresponding at all times for the 
technological and social progress of society. 
Provide for the establishment of a tripartite commission which develops health and 
sa~ety stan~ds and re?ulations. Its work would be resourced by a research and 
tramm~ facd~t~ or Instttu.te and e~forced through an executive authority. Such a 
model Is specifically provided form the ACOSH Discussion Paper. 
Establish (in cl~se co-operation ~ith the ACC) a mixed system of experience-rating 
and penalty-rati~g so that the mvestment of employers in safety is reflected in 
reduced ACC levies. 
Ensur~ the continuation of an improved system of enforcement of the standards 
established by the Commission through a well resourced and well trained 
Inspe~torate who would have the power to impose severe penalties and require 
compliance. 
Establish a system of licensing new work places, processes, and toxic substances. 
Make man~tory the present Code of Practice for Health and Safety Representatives 
and Committees. 
Pr?vide resources to ensure that Health & Safety Representatives are adequately 
tramed and supported through Trade Union Health and Safety Centres and unions 
themselves. 
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Provide additional resources to provide specialist training for health professionals 
involved in occupational health and safety. Occupational health has been the 
Cinderella of the New Zealand health scene for too long. 
Ensure the continuation of the present rate of health & safety legislation and 
regulations pending their review and consolidation by the new Commission. 
Finally I would like to acknowledge the extent of agreement on policy matters there 
has been between the employer and union representatives on ACOSH. I think we all (and 
I include those who take the trouble to attend a seminar such as this) agree that the mere 
enactment of new legislation will not in itself solve the problem of workplace hazards, as 
the history of factory legislation clearly demonstrates. However, if enacted as proposed by 
ACOSH, I believe it will provide a sound basis for a strong tripartite effort at all levels. 
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